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This study provides a deeper understanding of the relevance of the entrepreneurship 
phenomenon to the franchisee context. A number of studies have echoed that the franchisee 
plays an important role in the generation of new ideas and innovations for the franchise 
system. But we still do not know how franchisees maximize their entrepreneurial behaviors 
without jeopardizing the desires for standardization and uniformity, which are building 
blocks of franchising. We address this research question, using evidence from multiple case 
studies of UK-based franchisees. The study revealed patterns that were used to develop a 
theoretical model, which demonstrates the utilization of different forms of formal franchisee 
networks for maximization of entrepreneurial behaviors through acquisition of relational and 
informational capital, intra-system competition, and franchisee learning. This study extends 
the literature on franchising and entrepreneurship, and offers important managerial 
implications for practitioners. Future research directions are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
… franchising is seldom viewed as a context in which entrepreneurship is possible, beyond the 
creation of the concept by a franchisor...Perhaps because of an apparently uniform and highly 
constrained context, the potential for entrepreneurship has often been considered inherently 
illegitimate, and therefore overlooked within franchise firms. (Clarkin and Rosa, 2005: 305-
306) 
 
Franchising1 has developed into one of the fastest growing forms of doing business for the 
last half century (DiPietro et al., 2007). In the UK, as in many other countries, the franchising 
                                                             
1 This article focuses on business format franchising, which ‘occurs when a firm (the franchisor) sells the right 
to use its trade name, operating systems, and product specifications to another firm (the franchisee)’ 
(Castrogiovanni et al., 2006: 27-28). 
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industry has been vibrant. It is currently worth an estimated £12.4 billion, consists of 809 
active franchise systems with 34,200 franchised outlets, and growth in average turnover per 
outlet and productivity continue to outperform the economy as a whole (British Franchise 
Directory and Guide, 2009; NatWest/British Franchise Association Survey, 2008). Based on 
data obtained from the World Franchise Council, Dant (2008) also reported that more than 
1500 franchising chains presently operate in the US, constituting over 760,000 franchisees 
and approximately 18 million employees. 
In spite of the increasing significance of franchising as a medium for entrepreneurial 
wealth creation (Sorenson and SØrensen, 2001), there has been limited studies on the conduct 
of entrepreneurship within the context of franchising on the whole (Falbe et al., 1998). Yet, 
the role of entrepreneurial phenomena in existing organizations continues to attract increasing 
interest in the academic literature (see for example, Antoncic and Hisrich, 2004; Kuratko et 
al., 2001; Rauch et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2008; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005; Zahra, 1991). 
Firm-level entrepreneurial behaviors are now widely acknowledged as a means for 
revitalizing established firms, and for achieving sustainable competitive advantage and 
superior performance (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Knight, 1997; Wiklund, 1999; Zahra, 1991; 
Zahra and Covin, 1995) in organizations of all types and sizes (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001; 
2004). Within the franchising context however, fostering entrepreneurial behaviors in 
franchised outlets may be considered worlds apart from the requirements for standardization 
and uniformity that are keystones of franchising (see Cox and Mason, 2007). Entrepreneurial 
activity by the franchisee is sometimes viewed as a paradox, with franchisors often stating 
their preference for selecting a manager, rather than an entrepreneur, as a franchisee in order 
to protect their business systems from unauthorized change (Falbe et al., 1998). 
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Essentially, franchisees have been characterized as merely purchasing ‘the rights to 
implement a franchisor’s concept, often in a predetermined area, in a highly prescribed 
manner, and only for a defined period of time’ (Clarkin and Rosa, 2005: 305). Therefore, it is 
often argued that owning a franchise is the antithesis of entrepreneurship as the franchisee 
follows a model developed by the franchisor and forfeits the independence associated with 
entrepreneurship as a result of the constraints of the franchise contract (Hoy, 2008)  As a 
franchisor stated: 
... [Franchisees] only bought the right to operate our stores under the trademark. That’s it. We 
own the trademark, and their only responsibility is to us, to follow our system and methods ... 
What we have come to realize is that [franchisees] aren’t entrepreneurs; they might think they 
are entrepreneurs, but they’re not. If they were really entrepreneurs, they’d go out and start 
their own business. (Birkeland, 2002: 140-141) 
Such views are commonly expressed amongst franchisors, as reiterated by a Chairman and 
CEO of a well-established, household name, franchise system who participated in one of our 
studies:  
Franchising is ..., conforming, following set procedures and proven methods, long standing 
methods. Franchising is not about re-inventing the wheel, but a clone of a successful model. 
Certainly not the field of an entrepreneur [from a franchisee perspective]…not in the franchise 
environment. This would encourage confrontation. 
 
Despite the standardization and highly restrictive context often portrayed within the 
franchising organizational form, it has been reported that restrictive franchise agreements are 
not always rigorously imposed unless in difficult situations, thus providing opportunities for 
franchisees to act entrepreneurially (Clarkin and Rosa, 2005). Although franchisees are 
usually governed by lengthy and detailed agreements, ex-ante contracts can never specify all 
contingencies (Phan et al., 1996). As such, the franchising relationship often goes beyond the 
formal interactions dictated by the contract and entrepreneurial-franchisees will always have 
strategic flexibility (ibid). In addition, a number of studies have echoed that franchisees 
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actually play an important role in innovative and entrepreneurial behaviors required within 
the franchise system. Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) argued that it is generally the franchisees 
who, through their local adaptation efforts, develop new market offerings, transform existing 
ones, and discover solutions to system-wide problems. Bürkle and Posselt (2008) also noted 
that in many systems, franchisees originate ideas for innovations as their proximity to 
customers provides better opportunities for them to assess customer benefits. 
While franchisees generate and experiment with new ideas, the problem lies in 
controlling their behaviors to maintain uniformity (Bradach, 1997) and this appears to be the 
major concern for many franchisors (Cox and Mason, 2007; Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). 
Despite the evidence that franchisees might occupy an entrepreneurial role, we still do not 
know how they maximize their entrepreneurial behaviors without jeopardizing 
standardization and uniformity2. We address this research question, drawing on multiple case 
study evidence of UK-based franchisees, in an attempt to provide an in-depth understanding 
of the dynamics of franchisees’ entrepreneurial behaviors within the standardized framework 
of the franchise system. Our study therefore, extends the literature on franchising and 
entrepreneurship by offering contributions toward the advancement of a theory of 
entrepreneurship in franchising. In the next section, we continue with a review of the relevant 
background literature on standardization and uniformity, and firm-level entrepreneurial 
behaviors in franchising. This is followed by a discussion of the research design adopted for 
the study, and a presentation of the research findings. The article concludes with a summary 
of the research implications, limitations, and future research directions. 
 
Standardization and Uniformity in Franchising 
                                                             
2 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this research focus for the paper. 
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The fact that franchising is designed around uniformly replicating a standardized business 
format, across an entire system, has led to much controversy on how entrepreneurial 
behaviors can thrive within this organizational form. Standardization entails the development 
of work patterns that are constantly applied and consistently adhered to, with the whole 
essence being to minimize variance in operations (Gilson et al., 2005). Studies by Cox and 
Mason (2007) and Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) examined the characteristics of business 
format franchising, the importance of standardization to these systems, and the 
standardization-adaptation tension of the franchise system. The provision of a standardized 
product/service is critical to the success of the franchise system (Cox and Mason, 2007), 
benefitting the system through image uniformity, quality control, and cost minimization 
(Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). The franchise business model improves efficiencies, and 
permits economies of scale and scope in marketing, purchasing, and product development 
(Michael, 1996) that enable both the franchisor and the franchisee to achieve cost 
minimization (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). In addition, the units in a chain share a common 
identity and operate under a trademark (Bradach, 1997). Franchise operations therefore, 
exhibit brand name capital that provides substantial informational value to consumers, and 
some of the more successful franchise chains are recognized for the unusual strength of their 
brand name (Norton, 1988). ‘If franchisees deviate from the system’s standard model in 
pursuit of their own self-interest this will lead to trademark erosion and quality deterioration’ 
(Cox and Mason, 2007:1056). Franchisee compliance to the standardized framework is thus, 
critical to the maintenance and development of the franchise system’s desired image 
(Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). 
However, the emphasis on the need for standardization in franchising contradicts with 
the geographically diverse nature of franchisees’ markets (Cox and Mason, 2007; Pizanti and 
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Lerner, 2003). As chains face heterogeneous markets, system-wide standards will frequently 
conflict with the different local market conditions (Sorenson and SØrensen, 2001) that 
usually characterize franchisees’ environments (Clarkin and Rosa, 2005). Most franchisees 
operate in territorial areas that differ with regard to market and resource conditions, such as 
income levels, consumer tastes and preferences, levels of competition (Cox and Mason, 
2007) and the nature of demand (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). These conditions cause 
franchisees to seek idiosyncratic adaptations in various areas of their businesses (Kaufmann 
and Eroglu, 1998). Adaptation demands become even more evident as the system matures 
due to mounting resistance from experienced franchisees, which may suggest the need for 
essential changes to the maturing system (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). Hence, to ensure 
sustainability, franchise systems must be capable of adapting to new opportunities and threats 
over time (Bradach, 1997), a situation that would involve the display of entrepreneurial 
behaviors within local outlets. Indeed, it has been suggested that the ability to adapt to a wide 
range of environmental conditions and opportunities on a sustained basis is part of building a 
company that is entrepreneurial in nature (Muzyka et al., 1995). 
Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998: 83) argued that ‘franchisors who incorrectly interpret 
their role  of system creator as implying autocratic leadership may ignore, or at least discount, 
solutions or recommendations from franchisees’, which may be valuable for the growth of 
their chains. A healthy franchise system should evolve over time with the shifts in its external 
environment while learning from its franchisees (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998) because an 
important strength of the franchise model is the franchisees’ local knowledge of their 
respective markets (Hoy, 2008). Under the resource constraint explanations for the adoption 
of franchising (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968–1969) it is believed that, in addition to both 
financial and human capital (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Watson et al., 2005), the franchisor 
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requires significant increases in informational capital for rapid growth (Dant et al., 1996). 
Since franchisees are often from their local markets and thus, well versed in local needs 
(Combs et al., 2004), the franchisor firm transfers the strain of understanding local market 
conditions to their franchisees by using the franchise organizational form in unknown areas 
(Minkler, 1990). Therefore, franchisees are likely to be more familiar with the local market 
conditions relative to the franchisor (Cox and Mason, 2007) and this may influence the need 
for entrepreneurial behaviors, as a result of local market adaptations, in franchised outlets.  
 
Firm-Level Entrepreneurial Behaviors and Franchising 
Several terms have been used in the literature to describe firm-level entrepreneurial 
behaviors, the entrepreneurial efforts within an existing organization (Sharma and Chrisman, 
1999). As identified in Antoncic and Hisrich (2001, 2004), Covin and Miles (1999), and 
Sharma and Chrisman (1999), these include terms such as corporate entrepreneurship, 
corporate venturing, intrapreneurship, firm-level entrepreneurial posture, entrepreneurial 
orientation, and innovative and entrepreneurial strategy making. Firm-level entrepreneurial 
behaviors can be viewed broadly as the ‘emergent behavioral intentions and behavior of an 
organization, which deviate from the customary way of doing business’ (Antoncic and 
Hisrich, 2004: 520). These constitute novel behaviors that the firm intends to employ in its 
pursuit of opportunities (Kuratko et al., 2001) and often involve allowing organizational 
members to operate outside the firm’s existing norms and strategies so as to think and act 
more independently (Lumpkin et al., 2009). 
Examples of franchisees’ firm-level entrepreneurial behaviors, mainly within the fast-
food industry sector, have been documented in the literature. Bradach’s (1997) qualitative 
study of five large US restaurant chains revealed that franchisees constantly searched for 
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ways to improve their businesses; they generated new ideas by proposing products for their 
local marketplace, which sometimes were later studied and adopted system-wide. According 
to the CEO of KFC quoted in Bradach (1997: 277), ‘... franchisees provide a spark of 
entrepreneurship’, a welcoming context for innovation and adaptation. In addition, evidence 
from a global ‘benchmark’ franchisor, McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd., shows that several of 
the company’s lead products, including the Big Mac, Filet-O-Fish, and Egg McMuffin were 
all originally conceived by McDonald’s franchisees (Bradach, 1998; Morrison and Lashley, 
2003; Stanworth et al., 1996). Frazer (2004) also reported that a number of product 
innovations at Pizza Hut, such as the introduction of salad bars and sweets, were introduced 
at the suggestion of franchisees following a structured process of experimentation. Darr et al. 
(1995) provided qualitative evidence to demonstrate that franchise store level innovation can 
provide system-wide benefits through extensive transfer of learning amongst franchisees. 
The agency theory explanation for franchising may provide an additional rationale for 
why franchisees are often able to display entrepreneurial behaviors within their outlets, in  
spite of the desires for standardization and uniformity on which franchising is built. The 
franchising literature is virtually based exclusively on agency theory (Barthélemy, 2009), 
which revolves around the fact that when establishing a new outlet, organizations face a 
critical decision in terms of the choice of an agent that will run the outlet. They can either 
choose a salaried manager to run a company owned outlet, or a franchisee who will be 
allowed to keep the outlet’s profits in return for a fee (Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). Although the 
delegation of responsibility in both cases incurs agency costs (Tracey and Jarvis, 2007), 
franchisors may opt for the latter alternative in order to minimize monitoring and shirking 
costs that would have been associated with having company-owned outlet managers 
(Brickley and Dark, 1987; Mathewson and Winter, 1985). Since the franchisees’ rewards are 
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directly related to how well their unit(s) performed in the local marketplace (Bradach, 1997), 
franchisees tend to have stronger incentives relative to salaried managers (Yin and Zajac, 
2004). Therefore, franchisees are likely to be more sensitive to local market conditions and 
the financial performance of their local outlets (Yin and Zajac, 2004) by continually looking 
for means to advance their businesses (Bradach, 1997). This often involves behaving in an 
entrepreneurial manner by seeking new opportunities. 
The major differences between company ownership and franchising (Barthélemy, 
2009), which provide further insights for the potential for entrepreneurial behaviors in the 
latter, are shown in studies on the ‘Plural Form’. Bradach (1997) examined the governance 
structures adopted by chains, referred to as the Plural Form, a mix of both company outlets 
and franchised outlets. As Bradach (1997: 277) stated, the company arrangement involves an 
authority relationship that binds managers to the chain, but ‘... franchisees are bound to the 
chain with a relational contract, with explicit and implicit rights and obligations, which 
provides the motivation and autonomy to generate and experiment with new ideas’. In 
general, company-owned arrangements are much more hierarchical and are subject to much 
more control and monitoring from the franchisor, and the scope of decision-making rights is 
typically centralized and specialized, unlike in franchised arrangements which involve a 
decentralized decision-making process (Yin and Zajac, 2004). Consequently, company-
owned outlets have local compliance, while franchised outlets have local choice that enables 
franchisees to demonstrate a high level of local autonomy and self-management (Yin and 
Zajac, 2004) which could increase the franchisee’s potential for entrepreneurial behaviors. 
Sorenson and Sørensen (2001) analyzed a longitudinal dataset of US-based restaurant 
chains to show that the choice of governance structures influences the process of 
organizational learning and the types of effort expended by managers and franchisees. 
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Managers of company-owned outlets focus on exploitation learning (the refinement of 
existing routines) due to the high levels of monitoring that discourages innovation and 
provides incentives for them to focus on the maintenance of established standards. On the 
other hand, franchisees tend to search more broadly through exploratory learning (the 
development of new routines) because they more frequently adapt the outlet to local 
conditions. Hence, franchisees have a better tolerance for risk relative to the managers of 
company-owned outlets, and they are more willing to invest in innovations that can generate 
returns under longer time horizons. 
Although it may seem that the franchisee role inherently provides a scope for 
entrepreneurial behaviors that could benefit the entire system, this situation could become 
problematic (Baucus et al., 1996; Gassenheimer et al., 1996). Increasing levels of autonomy 
on the part of franchisees can raise the costs from agency problems (notably free riding) 
present in any franchisor-franchisee dyad (Cochet et al., 2008). Opportunistic franchisees 
may be tempted to increase their short-term profitability by free riding on the brand name 
(Barthélemy, 2009). As Kidwell et al. (2007) argued, free riding can damage brand reputation 
and firm survival, and thus, franchisee free riding can have negative consequences on 
franchise performance. The franchisor’s critical role of system protector therefore, makes 
many franchisors become rather rigid and formalistic in their maintenance of every detail 
(Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). This reinforces why it is important to understand ways in 
which franchisees maximize their entrepreneurial behaviors, without jeopardizing the 
standardization and uniformity of the franchise system. To the best of our knowledge we are 
not aware of any in-depth study that has examined how this goal is accomplished.  
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Methodology 
Research Design 
To address our research question, a phenomenological research paradigm (Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 1991), involving multiple case study (holistic) design (Rowley, 2002), was 
adopted ‘to capture the complexity and subtlety of actual business practice’ (Elango and Fried, 1997: 
77). The literature has reiterated the need for more qualitative methods in the fields of general 
management (Gill and Johnson, 1997), entrepreneurship (Gartner and Birley, 2002), and franchising 
(Elango and Fried, 1997; Gauzente, 2002). The case study approach was particularly appropriate for 
this study given the ambiguities surrounding the research issues. As noted by Ghauri and GrØnhaug 
(2002: 88–89), ‘carrying out intensive case studies of selected examples, incidents or decision making 
processes is a useful method when the area of research is relatively less known’. Moreover, this 
approach was suitable since our aim was to provide an in-depth understanding of the meanings and 
explanations that individuals place upon their experiences, rather than measuring (Cope, 2005; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Our focus was on identifying patterns in human behaviors and activities 
which may be repeated in other similar situations (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Accordingly, 
phenomenological inquiry, involving case studies, was ‘a robust research approach’ for the purpose of 
this study in order ‘to generate theory that is both useful and credible’ (Cope, 2005: 169, 171). 
 
Case selection 
Based on the replication logic (Yin, 2003), six cases (franchisees) from three different franchise 
systems were purposely selected (Patton, 2002) for this study. As Eisenhardt (1989) noted, it is 
common and sometimes necessary for researchers to plan the number of cases in their study in 
advance. Although there is no perfect number of cases, selecting between 4 and 10 cases usually 
works well, as less than four cases may produce unconvincing empirical grounding and more than10 
cases lead to difficulty in coping with the complexity and volume of the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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This recommendation for case selection has been followed in studies examining entrepreneurial 
franchisees (for example, Merrilees and Frazer, 2006). 
The cases for our study comprised franchisees from our networks of prior research 
participants who took part in an earlier related research project. In ensuring consistency with the 
purpose of this study, the franchisees were selected solely because they operated within systems that 
fostered entrepreneurial behaviors in franchised outlets and they were all entrepreneurial individuals 
who had undertaken/were in the process of undertaking different entrepreneurial activities, including 
the introduction of new products, new services and new methods of operations. Thus, ‘ultimately, 
each participant was chosen for the unique and highly interesting story that they would bring to the 
research process’ (Cope, 2005: 175), rather than being chosen to be representative of the entire 
population of franchisees. According to Patton (2002: 230), the ‘... logic and power of purposeful 
sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. Information-rich cases are those 
from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the 
inquiry...’. 
Our focus on franchisees as key informants is consistent with the state of the literature that the 
franchisee’s behavior constitutes the core of the debate surrounding franchising as the antithesis 
of entrepreneurship (see for example Falbe et al., 1998; Hoy, 2008). By purposefully selecting 
franchisees as key informants, our study also addressed a major limitation associated with most 
franchising research. A recent study by Dant (2008), on key research gaps in franchising studies, 
indicated that much of what we know about this field is based on studies of the franchisors to the 
virtual exclusion of research conducted from the franchisee perspective. Thus, ‘… questions 
constantly arise about … the applicability of franchisor-based research findings to the mindset of 
franchisees’ (Dant, 2008: 92).  
All the franchisees selected for this study were operating within the Property Services sector 
(based on the European Franchise Federation (EFF) classification). Their services involved three 
distinct but related franchising activities: (1) Estate Agents and Property Management; (2) Property 
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and Maintenance Services, Home Improvements; (3) Property Surveys and Risks Assessment (British 
Franchise Directory and Guide, 2009; NatWest/British Franchise Association Survey, 2008). Over the 
past seven years, the Property Services sector has experienced the highest level of system growth 
(62%) amongst UK-based franchise systems and is now the largest sector in terms of number of 
franchise systems, accounting for a quarter of the total number (NatWest/British Franchise 
Association Survey, 2008). By drawing on evidence from franchisees operating within the property-
based sector, we were able to extend the literature on entrepreneurial behaviors amongst franchisees, 
beyond the fast-food sector. As evident from our literature review, most of  the studies that have 
examined issues related to franchisees’ entrepreneurial behaviors were based on investigations of the 
fast-food sector. Accordingly, we addressed another important research gap identified in Dant’s 
(2008) recent study suggesting the need to examine other franchising sectors to inform the future 
research agenda. Furthermore, a study of franchisees within the UK context enabled us to extend prior 
studies, as most franchising research and the ensuing theory development have focused virtually 
exclusively on the US (Dant, 2008). Besides, focusing on a single industry sector, within the UK 
context, enabled us to control for cross-industry and extraneous variations (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Liberman-Yaconi et al., 2010).   
 
Data Collection 
To enhance the reliability and the validity of the case study evidence, the following 
techniques suggested by researchers such as Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) were 
employed. Multiple sources of evidence were used to enable triangulation of data and 
stronger corroboration of constructs. These included the following elements: (a) semi-
structured interviews with key informants. In most cases, the interviews were carried out at 
the franchisees’ outlets to facilitate on-site observations. The interviews were tape-recorded, 
lasted between 1 and 1.5hrs, and the questions centered on franchisees’ views regarding 
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entrepreneurship within their outlets and systems. Questions were asked regarding the culture 
of the franchise system with respect to fostering/preventing entrepreneurial behaviors, 
respondents’ understanding of the term entrepreneurship, and the nature and impacts of any 
entrepreneurial behaviors displayed or entrepreneurial activities undertaken. (b) Focused 
interviews with franchisors and/or key representatives from the franchisor headquarters such 
as the Research and Development Managers, and the Franchise Managers. These interviews 
were used to corroborate the findings from the franchisee perspective and focused on 
franchisors’ attitudes towards entrepreneurial behaviors in their businesses and amongst their 
franchisees. (c) To further validate our analysis, both the franchisors and franchisees 
completed similar questionnaires, prior to the interviews, to confirm the extent to which their 
systems were entrepreneurial. (d) Finally, we undertook documentary analysis of relevant 
franchise brochures and the organizations’ websites. 
Furthermore, a case study protocol was created in advance to provide directions for 
the researchers. This contained the procedures and the general rules to be followed 
throughout the data collection to ensure consistency. In addition, a case study database was 
developed as a formal assembly of evidence distinct from the final case study report. This 
included information obtained prior to the interviews from documents and websites, notes 
taken during the interviews, and transcribed text from interview tapes. A chain of evidence 
was maintained to show explicit links between the questions asked, the data collected, and the 
conclusions drawn. On completion of the data collection, the case study reports were 
reviewed by the corresponding key informants.  
 
Data Analysis 
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The analytical process was data driven via content analysis (Patton, 2002). It comprised four 
levels of analysis suggested by Cope (2005) for analyzing phenomenological inquiry. The 
first level involved a detailed transcription of the interviews as well as within-case analysis 
for the independent cases, in order to gain familiarity with the data as a stand-alone entity 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). These involved repeated readings of the transcripts, and note taking of the 
key themes within the margins of the transcripts (Patton, 1990). The second level of analysis 
entailed writing out a comprehensive description of the separate cases. Hence, we built up a 
more coherent and manageable report, from a somewhat cluttered and disjointed transcript, 
thereby enabling more structured content analysis across the cases (Cope, 2005). For the third 
level of analysis, we undertook cross-case comparison by looking for patterns and themes 
that cut across individual experiences (Patton, 2002). To aid theory development, visual 
representations were used to graphically depict emerging set of relationships (Whetten, 
1989). A resulting model was derived by comparing the visual maps of the different cases, 
and identifying common sequences and themes (Zerbinati and Souitaris, 2005). Finally, the 
fourth level of analysis involved comparing emergent themes with the existing literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Description of the Cases 
Table 1 presents the profiles of the six cases studied. The exact names of the participants are 
not disclosed as they were promised confidentiality.  
Insert Table 1 about here. 
EstateLeaders-1 & -2. These franchisees are both from the same franchise system, 
EstateLeaders, which is one of the UK’s leading lettings agent and property management 
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franchises. The organization is a full member of the British Franchise Association (BFA), the 
only independent accreditation body promoting ethical franchising in the UK. It offers a 
specialist service in property rental, residential lettings and buy-to-let for tenants and 
landlords. The organization was founded in the 90s and the first franchise was launched the 
year after the inauguration. It currently has over 140 franchised outlets and is now recognized 
as the fastest growing and arguably the largest specialist lettings franchise company in the 
UK. EstateLeaders–1 was the second individual to buy a franchise in the organization in 1996 
and owns a single outlet, and is also ranked as the top franchisee in this organization based on 
factors such as income generation and business development. EstateLeaders–2 owns two 
outlets and became a franchisee in 2004. 
 
ElectricalMasters–3, -4, & -5. These three franchisees are from the same franchise system, 
ElectricalMasters, which is a leading specialist electrical contractor, working with major blue 
chip organizations, local authorities, schools, and high security institutions. The organization 
was established in the 1970s, began franchising in early 2000, and currently has over 20 
franchised outlets in the UK. The organization is a full member of the BFA. As part of the 
franchise offering, franchisees cover portable appliance testing, fire extinguisher 
maintenance, fire alarm systems, and emergency lighting/signs installation and maintenance. 
ElectricalMasters–3 was the first individual to buy a franchise in this organization in 2001 
and owns a single outlet. ElectricalMasters–4 owns a single outlet and has been with the 
organization since 2005. ElectricalMasters–5 has also been with the organization since 2005 
and owns 2 outlets. 
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SurveyorManagers–6.  Founded in 2003, SurveyorManagers franchise system is driven by 
health and safety legislation, and currently has over 20 franchised outlets in the UK. The 
organization is a provisional member of the BFA. The franchisees within this organization 
provide surveys and management plans to help companies comply with government 
legislations, stipulating that all commercial premises should have a particular health and 
safety register. SurveyorManagers–6 has been operating within this system since 2004 and 
owns a single outlet.  
 
Toward a Theoretical Model of Entrepreneurial Behaviors amongst 
Franchisees 
Evidence from all the cases demonstrated that entrepreneurial behaviors amongst 
franchisees were maximized through the use of formal franchisee networks – internal 
networks and regular networking activities – within the franchise systems. Networks 
represent forms of voluntary cooperation that involve information sharing, mutual learning, 
social control, and exchange between their members (Johannisson et al., 2002). As Houghton 
et al. (2009) noted, networks internal to the firm serve as a medium for relatively safe 
corridors of conversation for organizational actors to digest external information and reach a 
consensus for action.  
Findings from our cases showed that the franchisee networks involved the utilization of 
franchisee forums, working groups, and regional and national meetings for franchisee-
interaction activities. These provided avenues for franchisees to work in clusters to 
disseminate knowledge, which in turn maximized entrepreneurial behaviors in three ways: (1) 
Acquisition of relational and informational capital – boosting franchisees’ stock of system-
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specific asset; (2) Promotion of intra-system competition – fostering internal competitive 
aggressiveness amongst franchisees; and (3) Facilitation of franchisee learning – enhancing 
the generation of new knowledge. This process produced important organizational outcomes 
for both the franchisees and their systems, in terms of business growth, system-wide 
adaptations, market leadership, and solutions to business problems. A model of maximization 
of entrepreneurial behaviors among franchisees is shown in Figure 1. This is explained below 
in detail, using relevant quotes from the key informants for illustration.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
 
 
Acquisition of Relational and Informational Capital. As highlighted by Watson et al. 
(2005: 26), “[s]ervice sector businesses [such as our case organizations], by their very nature, 
have relatively few assets that are tangible, and therefore much of their success relates to the 
ability to effectively manage and maximize the value of their intangible assets”. These 
intangible assets include both relational and informational capital. Relational capital can be 
conceptualized as an organizational member’s business relationships, connections, 
acquaintances, and networks both internal and external to the organization (Griffith and 
Lusch, 2007). Informational capital involves an organizational member’s knowledge of his or 
her firm’s products or services, customers, competitors, and industry (Griffith and Lusch, 
2007). Our study demonstrated that the franchisee networks enabled franchisees to boost their 
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stock of both relational and informational capital facets. Franchisees from all of the case 
systems discussed the importance of the franchisee forum3: 
 ...we have franchisee forums ... ... As part of the franchisee network ... we discuss issues 
relating to entrepreneurship at the forum ... In other words, some people ... want to do more, 
like, to stretch the boundaries ..., we share ideas and we talk to one another enough ... and 
through that you get additional information as to whether that’s a good idea, so you go and 
look at that. (SurveyorManagers–6) 
 
... we all have a forum once every three months ... we discuss how we want to move things 
forward ... there is a lot of ideas coming out from franchisees obviously to develop their 
business, and that all comes back ... so in that kind of way, people are bringing in ideas ... ... 
We are all kind of working with this forum to set up new ideas to develop the business ... we 
talk and we send information across. So you are kind of talking to people with the same 
situation. They are saying, well, I’ve found that this does work ... (ElectricalMasters–3) 
 
They [the franchisor] have ...  started a thing called forum, where the franchise manager and a 
representative from the South East, the South West, and Northern region, go and have a 
meeting once or twice a year to talk about developments and anything that the franchisees 
want to try and bring in, or develop, or expand … this was a formal way  ... for us to put ideas 
forward and get them discussed. (ElectricalMasters–4)  
 
... we ... get a lot more interaction with the other franchisees because we get together quite 
often. You know these ideas bounce backwards and forwards, and we sort of take ideas ... We 
have what is called a national forum.... The forum is very good because it means we can help 
direct the business in the right direction ... They [the franchisor] don’t have the day to day 
experience ... so we bring along experience on a day to day basis of running a franchise, and 
what the market is like… I would say for the last year the majority of the ideas that have been 
brought forward have come from the forum. It’s us franchisees helping to take the business 
forward. (EstateLeaders–1) 
 
Relevant external agencies were sometimes invited to the franchisee networks to provide 
additional information, for example:  
We also at the regional meetings get outside agencies in to, like, if someone has a good idea, 
then they will bring along information to hand out to everybody ... So, again our next regional 
meeting is on the 12th of June, I’ve invited [an external agency] to come and give a 
presentation on the new product that we are just about to launch. (EstateLeaders–1) 
 
                                                             
3 The franchisee forums are essentially some form of franchisee advisory council – although a variety of names 
(e.g. franchisee associations, franchisee committees, franchisee councils, and franchisee advisory boards) are 
used by different franchise systems and in different studies (see Berndt, 2008; Bradach, 1998; Cochet and  
Erhmann, 2007; Gillis and Combs, 2009; Grueneberg, 2004). These bodies typically ‘offer a forum where 
otherwise dispersed interests of the [franchise system’s] local entrepreneurs [franchisees] are grouped, thereby 
reducing the power disadvantage of individual franchisees vis-à-vis the parent corporation’ (Cochet and 
Erhmann, 2007: 43). 
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These findings are consistent with extant literature that individuals tend to possess 
different stocks of information which are produced through idiosyncratic life experience 
(Shane, 2000) and networks facilitate knowledge acquisition and sensemaking activities 
(Houghton et al., 2009). As such, entrepreneurs usually receive motivations from other 
entrepreneurs and networking is vital for a venture’s growth (Evans and Volery, 2001). Our 
findings also provide support for those of Cox and Mason (2007) where it was reported that 
some franchisors had formal committees with franchisee involvement to generate ideas for 
future development of the business. Thus, the findings lead us to put forward two 
propositions: 
Proposition one: Franchisee networks positively influence franchisees’ stock of 
relational and informational capital 
Proposition two: Franchisees’ stock of relational and informational capital positively 
influences franchisee entrepreneurial behaviours 
 
Intra-System Competition. A high degree of competitiveness was observed amongst the 
franchisees, as they strived to be the best within their systems through their entrepreneurial 
behaviors. The franchisees’ competitive aggressiveness was attributed to the networking 
schemes that had been designed by franchisors, as shown in the following excerpts:  
... the way they [the franchisor] bring people [franchisees] together and make people aware of 
what other people are doing [in the system]  ...  makes it like a ...  competition. So you almost 
think that, right, I want to prove to myself and get another three places up the league table, 
and things like that. So it’s sort of a bit of a drive forward. (EstateLeaders–2)  
 
There is also what he [the franchisor] calls the ‘High Achievers’ Club’, judged on how much 
an individual brings to the group, our ideas and that sort of stuff ... It’s [made up of] the top 
12 franchisees, ... and they have awards like the ‘Franchisee of the Year’, and I’ve got that ... 
So for a franchisee to win, he would have to give more than just being a franchisee. ... I would 
say it’s trying to better yourself, trying to be the best ... I am ...  the top franchisee, so he pays 
particular attention to me. (EstateLeaders–1) 
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These findings provide some support for Cox and Mason’s (2007) study, where one-quarter 
of the franchisors used competitions amongst franchisees to generate new ideas and held 
award ceremonies with cash prizes to reward the best ideas. The above illustrations also 
suggest that entrepreneurially distinct franchisees seem to enjoy a closer bond with the 
franchisor. A franchisee further explained how standing out, in terms of entrepreneurial 
behaviors, enables outstanding franchisees to obtain lower royalty rates – the proportion of 
revenue paid to the franchisor by franchisees (Michael and Combs, 2008) – from the 
franchisor. While most of the other franchisees in this system paid a royalty of 30 percent on 
sales on monthly basis, only a few franchisees were allowed to pay a royalty of 10 percent. 
This was mainly because the latter brought more entrepreneurial initiatives to the forum 
which had huge, positive knock-on-effects on individual franchised outlets as well as the 
entire system, with regard to increase in sales.  
Furthermore, our study revealed that franchisees extended their intra-system 
competitiveness to their external environments by competing aggressively to be the best in 
their local marketplace. This involved continual search for ways to lead, rather than follow 
the market. As a franchisee explained:  
One of the other jobs I’ve got is that we set up working groups to look at specific areas of the 
business to make sure we are the leaders in the market ... it’s just trying to do something 
different to your competitor, that’s what entrepreneurism is, doing something different, 
having a USP, Unique Selling Point. That’s what we try to look at all the time. 
(EstateLeaders–1) 
 
Cochet and Erhmann (2007) pointed out that specialized working groups are alternative 
means to group the interests of franchisees. In essence, it was stressed that:  
... they [the franchisor] ... try and make you see that you’ve got to be different to 
everyone else out there. You know, there is competition in every marketplace and in 
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every field. So the only way you gonna get forward is to be different and bring 
different qualities to the forefront of the market ...(EstateLeaders–2) 
 
Indeed Falbe et al. (1998) argued that franchisors experiencing increased competition are 
more likely to implement entrepreneurial strategies and to encourage their franchisees to be 
innovative. Thus, 
Proposition three: Franchisee networks positively influence intra-system competition 
Proposition four: Intra system competition positively influences franchisee entrepreneurial 
behaviours 
  
Franchisee Learning. Learning is the process by which knowledge is generated (Harrison 
and Leitch, 2005). According to Hult et al. (2003: 542), it can be broadly defined as ‘the 
values and beliefs associated with the development of new knowledge that has the potential 
to influence behavior’. This definition follows from Huber (1991: 89) that ‘an entity learns if, 
through its processing of information, the range of its potential behaviors is changed’. 
Learning at an organizational level continues to be an important issue for all types of firms 
(Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 2005) and it depends on the development of personal knowledge 
and skills, and having effective systems for knowledge sharing (Jones and Macpherson, 
2006). 
Evidence from our cases indicated that the networks were essentially facilitating 
learning processes through franchisees’ experiences of operating similar concepts in different 
markets/territorial areas. According to the franchisees:…  
the biggest support [obtained from the franchisor] is putting you in contact with other 
franchisees to enable you to sort of bring ideas together and discuss them ... A lot of the time, 
in the forums, it’s more of I’ve done this, why don’t you see if it can work for your business 
and things? There is more of that, rather than, how about try this ... (EstateLeaders–2)  
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For instance, ... I have been looking at [a new product], and from November I’m introducing 
the new product, which is my idea. And I have taken it to the forum, and I did all my research 
before, like you are doing now. So I have got a product and how much it’s going to cost and 
what it’s going to do, and I have given them the details in the forum and they all said thank 
you very much we love it …. (EstateLeaders–1) 
 
 
These findings are consistent with Miller and Friesen’s (1982) argument that organizations 
operating in several different markets tend to learn from their broad experience, while 
borrowing ideas from one market and applying them in another. Our findings are also in line 
with prior studies that have shown that an organization’s learning orientation is positively 
related to corporate entrepreneurship (Holt et al., 2007).  
In addition, the franchisee networks provided avenues for evaluation of ideas and 
problem solving:   
It [the forum] is almost like a sounding board, I suppose, to say, I’ve had this idea, do you see 
any flaws in it? So you’ve got like-minded individuals there that could turn round and say, 
well it’s a great idea, but what if this happens, which you might not have thought about when 
you are sitting in your office on your own. (EstateLeaders–2) 
 
... So those kinds of problems, if you put it out on the network, there is always simply 
someone else who have to come up and help with it. (ElectricalMasters–3)  
 
Another franchisee explained how, within their forum, they were able to learn about a 
solution to a long-standing operational problem, associated with the system’s growth over the 
years. After several failed attempts at trying to solve the problem, which was affecting all the 
franchisees, the system’s first franchisee put forward a novel idea. This eventually provided a 
solution to the problem, and also led to the development of a major technological innovation, 
which was now classed as an invention within the system and their industry sector. 
According to the franchisee:  
I kept talking to them [other franchisees] about it ... I mean, ... we’ve got to get this sorted ... 
So when I came up with the idea ... we worked quite well together ... We sat down with the 
manufacturers and said, look this is what we want, can you do this? .... we pushed it forward 
... The market has been opened up by us really ... It’s new idea, no one is doing this at all ... 
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It’s not just me personally who introduced [the new product], we’ve worked together to join it 
together ... (ElectricalMasters–3) 
  
 In addition, franchisees highlighted the effects of the age of their outlets (that is, the 
length of time they had been in operation) on learning within the franchisee networks, and 
how this factor influences the ability of the franchisees to be entrepreneurial. According to a 
franchisee who was the second individual to purchase a franchise in his system:  
 I think that there is a process you go through, I’m probably an entrepreneur now because of 
the ideas that I bring to the table. In the early days, franchisees set about doing what they are 
doing and learning from others, as opposed to bringing up ideas themselves. (EstateLeaders–
1) 
 
Another franchisee stated that:  
I think as you become more experienced you become bolder in your approach to these things 
[entrepreneurial behaviors] you know. When you first start up you are really learning ... you 
need someone to support you on these ... things. But as you become more experienced, and 
confident, I think you become more entrepreneurial in your willingness to try new things and 
be a bit bolder. (SurveyorManagers–6) 
 
In line with our findings, Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) argued that as franchisees mature, so 
does their experience and most of them tend to develop an expertise in their local markets 
which may even exceed that of the franchisor.  
Franchisors’ interests in using the franchisee networks as a learning medium were also 
emphasized:  
... there are always opportunities there to explore ... the franchisor wants us to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities … because they like us to report back to the group. So if you have 
done something which works out well, in say [your area], and you take it back to everyone 
else it can affect the whole group. (EstateLeaders–2) 
 
They [the franchisor] have employed a franchise coordinator for the franchisees because 
before there wasn’t any. He [the franchise coordinator] is now joining us [franchisees] all 
together. So we all have a forum once every 3 months. Basically, we discuss ... how we want 
to move things forward, ..., that kind of thing, and then, come to an agreement on what we 
could possibly do about it, and then try and move that forward. (ElectricalMasters–3) 
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Thus it would seem that the forum plays an important role in developing franchisee learning, 
and that as franchisees mature, they are more likely to engage in entrepreneurial actitivities. 
We therefore put forward: 
Proposition five: Franchisee networks positively influence franchisee learning 
Proposition six: Franchisee learning positively influences franchisee entrepreneurial 
behaviours 
Proposition seven: Age (in terms of length of operation) of franchisees positively influences 
franchisee entrepreneurial behaviours 
 
Entrepreneurial Behaviors and Standardization  
The franchisee networks appeared to be some form of formalized and institutionalized 
management support for corporate entrepreneurship (Marvel et al., 2007; Zahra et al., 2009) 
that enables franchisees to discuss and exchange ideas (Kelley et al., 2009). Some of the 
systems had designated franchisees who acted as representatives to communicate initiatives 
that arose amongst the franchisees to the franchisor headquarters. For instance:  
We have one representative for each region. So, basically, you talk to that person. That one 
representative of the region will go and then have a meeting for that area with our head office 
[franchisor] and another person. (ElectricalMasters–3) 
 
The representatives were regarded as ‘the voice of the other franchisees’ 
(ElectricalMasters–5), and they were usually the older franchisees who had been in operation 
for a longer period of time. In addition, some of the systems had representatives specifically 
assigned from the franchisor headquarters. These involved the delegation of franchise 
coordinators and franchise managers to monitor the franchisee networks. As the franchisees 
commented:  
When you’ve got at least 30 franchisees around the country, with the amount of information 
we are producing, you need someone to tie them up together. (ElectricalMasters–3)  
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We have ... three seats on the forum from central office [the franchisor], the rest of the seats 
are made up of franchisees. (EstateLeaders–1) 
 
Although entrepreneurial behaviors were maximized through the franchisee networks, 
franchisees emphasized that they were expected to display such behaviors within the 
boundaries of the franchise, implying that standardization is key to the franchisor: 
They [the franchisor] allow you to have a certain amount of entrepreneurial freedom, they like 
you to develop your own business and work with as much freedom as possible. But ... they 
don’t want you to be too adventurous; they want you to stay within the remit of the franchise, 
but to expand the business as best as you can within the fields that they operate. 
(ElectricalMasters–4) 
 
We can’t do anything outside the contract that affects [the franchise system], and the other 
one is that we have guidelines; we have certain guidelines to follow when doing certain 
activities. (EstateLeaders–1) 
 
If I decided to do something completely different, from an entrepreneurial point of view, they 
[the franchisor] wouldn’t want that ... They wouldn’t sanction that at all. I have to stick within 
the rules of what I do ... It depends on how broad a spectrum I want to seek opportunities in. 
(SurveyorManagers–6) 
 
Thus, the importance of the structure of networks in enabling controlled entrepreneuship seems 
evident. We therefore suggest: 
Proposition eight: The structure and extent of formalisation of franchisee networks within 
entrepreneurial systems will influence the franchisor’s ability to maintain standardisation within the 
system 
 
Organizational Outcomes of Franchisees’ Entrepreneurial Behaviors 
Entrepreneurial behavior gives rise to diverse individual and organizational-level outcomes 
(Ireland et al., 2009). Evidence from the cases demonstrated that franchisees were generally 
creating new value through their entrepreneurial behaviors. These encompassed business 
growth, system-wide adaptability of their entrepreneurial initiatives, solutions to persistent 
operational problems, and market leadership. According to one of the franchisees:  
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The concept that we had when I first started … was a cottage industry type business, ... 
working from home, earning about 60,000 a year, no shop, no vans, no staff, nothing. Look 
where I am today, I’ve got 11 staff, 500 properties, four vans … So we have helped him [the 
franchisor] tremendously get to where we are today. (EstateLeaders–1) 
 
Another argued:  
We are leading the market in what we want to do. Just by putting this forward, no one else has 
thought of this, you see, not even the people that manufactured the box. We have now 
combined the paperwork with the box. So it’s all in one unit now … we have moved a whole 
industry forward now because of this .... (ElectricalMasters–3) 
 
Evidence also revealed the following:  
 … the outcome is that I have a larger network of people from whom I can get business ... So I 
think it’s worth going out there and doing it [being entrepreneurial]. (SurveyorManagers–6)  
 
Following successful trials, franchisees’ ideas were rolled out systemwide:  
 It’s very rare for central office [the franchisor] to come to us [franchisees] with an idea. It’s 
actually us going back to them with an idea. We then look at it, then we trial it in a specific 
area, and if it works then it is put out to all the other franchisees ... We’ve got [someone] in 
central office that looks after this sort of stuff ... So he would come to us and say, right, this is 
the sort of response we got from this new product, this is how much it costs us. So when it 
goes to franchisees, franchisees can see if they spend that amount of money, then they are 
going to get that much money back. Then it’s worth doing. (EstateLeaders–1)  
 
These findings agree with studies that have suggested that franchisees can be useful sources 
of new ideas and innovations for product/service development (Cox and Mason, 2007).  
We found that the outcomes of franchisees’ entrepreneurial behaviors were parallel to 
the reasons why their franchisors seemed to want entrepreneurial behaviors within their 
systems, as highlighted in the following response:  
... the franchisor ... wants us to engage in entrepreneurial activities because obviously it is to 
their benefit ... that’s how they grow and that’s how we are meant to grow.  
(ElectricalMasters–3) 
 
The results were also similar to the franchisees’ motivations for exhibiting entrepreneurial 
behaviors. For instance:  
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Well, the motivating factor is to generate more business, which generates more income. 
That’s the simple part of it … Just to drive the business forward, to make it more successful, 
and to keep me gainfully employed, make money. (SurveyorManagers–6) 
 
To earn a bit of money. We are not doing it [being entrepreneurial] for the love of it. It’s to 
earn a bit of money at the end of the day. (ElectricalMasters–3) 
  
 
This would suggest that entrepreneurial behaviour by franchisees can have a positive impact 
on system performance. Thus: 
Proposition nine:  The performance outcomes of franchise systems will increase with 
franchisee entrepreneurial behaviours 
Concluding Remarks 
This study aids the development of a theory of entrepreneurship within the context of 
franchising. The data analysis revealed some themes that led us to put forward a set of 
propositions which formed the basis of a theoretical model for maximizing entrepreneurial 
behaviors amongst franchisees. This involved the utilization of formal franchisee networks 
(forums, working groups, and regional and national meetings) to facilitate acquisition of 
relational and informational capital, intra-system competition, and franchisee learning. The 
culmination of franchisees’ entrepreneurial behaviors encompassed business growth, system-
wide adaptability of their entrepreneurial initiatives, solutions to persistent operational 
problems, and market leadership. Although much of the literature has focused on external 
networking activities, research suggests that a strong internal network capability is an 
effective technique for improving firm performance (Sawyerr et al., 2003; Walter et al., 
2006), consistent with our findings.  
The findings, in emphasizing the importance of franchisee networks in fostering 
entrepreneurial behaviors whilst still maintaining control, highlight the role of the franchisor 
in creating an environment to encourage and support franchisee innovation. Perhaps this is of 
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little surprise, as the role of senior management in developing and communicating cultural 
norms for fostering entrepreneurial processes and behaviors among organizational members 
(Ireland et al., 2009) is well established. The research though, provides new insights into how 
this can be achieved in franchise organizations. It stresses the need for franchisors to provide 
appropriate structures to enable franchisees to contribute to the development of the business. 
Those that do not adopt such an approach may risk franchisees forming their own 
associations to gain a collective voice – such associations are less likely to enable a ‘mutually 
beneficial exchange to materialize’ (Cochet and Erhmann 2007: 45). Grueneberg (2004) 
argued that independent franchisee associations are often formed out of conflict, with the 
intention being to do battle with the franchisor; as such, a franchisor would be judicious to 
form a franchisee advisory council before conflict breaks out in the system. Indeed, as Cochet 
and Erhmann (2007: 43) suggest, franchisor initiated councils can ‘provide the framework to 
agree on a common interpretation of the company’s obligations and to gather information on 
conflicts occurring in the channel. Coordination of individual outlet-owners is facilitated as a 
result’. Bradach (1997) also suggests that these venues are important for developing 
relationships with franchisees and for influencing their behaviors. Thus, the networks play an 
important role in facilitating ‘controlled entrepreneurship’, enabling the franchisor to exploit 
franchisee innovation, whilst still maintaining system control and uniformity. 
It would seem that franchisors are increasingly aware of the potential benefits of 
franchise councils. Bradach’s (1997) seminal study of five US franchise chains indicated that 
once franchisees became part of the system, chains maintained constant contact with them 
through, for example, annual, biannual or quarterly meetings, and through the use of 
committees of franchisees. Also, in 2006, the Natwest/ British Franchise Association Annual 
Survey, the principal study on franchising in the UK, showed an increase in the prevalence of 
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associations and support networks for franchisees. According to the survey, two in five 
franchisees reported that their franchisors had an association for them. Of those for whom it 
was available, 76 percent were members. As Cochet and Erhmann (2007: 44) comment: 
‘There is considerable evidence that chains are indeed aware of the important self-
commitment function fulfilled by such councils since they are usually deeply involved in 
initiating and financing these bodies (Arruñada et al., 2005; McCosker et al., 1995)’. This is 
in line with Grueneberg’s (2004: 22) point that councils are typically ‘created or nurtured by 
the franchisor rather than independently established by franchisees’. While all the preceding 
studies have suggested the use of different forms of gatherings, and in particular franchisee 
advisory councils, to bring franchisees together, the exact role of franchisee networks remains 
underexplored in the academic literature. Besides, we know of no prior in-depth studies that 
have shown the relevance of such networks for maximizing entrepreneurial behaviors 
amongst franchisees. Our findings open new directions for future researchers to contribute to 
this promising research area, given that the franchise framework in itself represents a 
network. The importance of networks has been documented extensively in the 
entrepreneurship and management literature (e.g. Birley, 1985; Houghton et al. 2009; Jack, 
2005; Walter et al., 2006) and such studies could offer more insights for studying this 
phenomenon within the franchising context. 
For practitioners, this research offers important managerial implications for both the 
franchisee and the franchisor. Evidence from the cases shows the benefits of intra-system 
networking for franchisees. For the franchisor, this study offers implications in two key areas: 
(1) the management of entrepreneurial behaviors among franchisees, and (2) the mechanisms 
for stimulating an entrepreneurial culture within franchised outlets. In line with the purpose 
of this article, all the systems that we studied had recognized the importance of fostering 
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entrepreneurial values amongst franchisees. Indeed the corporate entrepreneurship literature 
suggests that the parent company may need to grant subsidiaries greater autonomy to pursue 
local entrepreneurial opportunities in situations where the parent possesses little knowledge 
of local markets (Phan et al., 2009). This situation is apparent in the franchising context 
where franchisees tend to be more knowledgeable about their local markets (Cox and Mason, 
2007), as highlighted in our findings. However, many franchisors still uphold the argument 
that entrepreneurial behaviors would be damaging to the franchise system, as these go against 
the whole essence of the franchise concept, which requires standardization and uniformity. In 
fact, a series of exploratory interviews that we conducted with some franchisors, prior to 
undertaking the present study, revealed the extent to which some of them were strongly 
against the idea of nurturing an entrepreneurial climate across their systems. The main 
concern seems to be: how to control franchisees’ behaviors to maintain uniformity (Bradach, 
1997) while simultaneously granting them entrepreneurial autonomy. Our findings suggest 
that entrepreneurial behaviors amongst franchisees can be fostered and managed, without 
jeopardizing standardization and uniformity, through the use of formal franchisee networks. 
These could enable franchisor firms to formally scrutinize franchisees’ entrepreneurial 
initiatives in order to guide against them going beyond the remit of the business. Clarkin and 
Rosa’s (2005) study of North American franchises also revealed instances of a collaborative 
and positive context for accommodating franchisee innovations. These included the 
franchisee’s freedom to introduce new products without violating the franchise agreement, 
the franchisee’s ability to introduce new products with the franchisor’s permission, and the 
existence of an established mechanism for franchisees to submit ideas for product additions 
and enhancements.  
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The main limitations of this study relate to the small sample size, attributable to the 
case study approach. Given the extensiveness and diversity of the franchising industry, the 
results may not be representative of franchise systems as a whole, in terms of organizational 
characteristics such as franchise age and sector. However, our aim was not to generalize but 
to provide detailed understanding of the issues under consideration, and an in-depth 
qualitative research, involving multiple cases was considered appropriate. Moreover, there 
are other contextual factors that may influence franchisee entrepreneurial behaviors that were 
not explored in this study but could offer directions for future research. These include the 
effects of franchisee ownership structures single unit versus multi-unit ownership (Weaven et 
al., 2009) and the governance structures adopted by chains the simultaneous use of company-
owned and franchisee-owned outlets (Bradach, 1997). It has been argued that the extent of 
franchisee multi-unit ownership appears to vary by country – although it may be prevalent in 
the US, it is not the norm in the UK (Pizanti and Lerner, 2003). The majority of franchisees 
in the UK (78 percent) operate only single units, the minority with multi-unit have an average 
of just seven outlets each (NatWest/British Franchise Association Survey, 2008). However, 
we observed no differences in the findings from our cases, where only two of the franchisees 
had multi-unit ownership with two outlets each. In addition, evidence from all our cases 
suggested that the majority of the outlets were franchised as opposed to company-owned. 
Nevertheless, future research could examine the impacts of the history and size of the system 
on the entrepreneurship phenomenon within the context of franchise firms. These research 
avenues may be relevant in verifying and generalizing the results of the present study. 
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